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A BIMODAL FORCE FOR THE NATIONAL
MARITIME STRATEGY
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
While still serving in my first ship, I read a twelve-page article in the NavalInstitute Proceedings entitled “National Policy and the Transoceanic
Navy.” Written by Samuel P. Huntington, this durable and popular essay has
stuck with me ever since. As a source of wisdom for confronting both interna-
tional communism and the Soviet Union, “Transoceanic Navy” is not as incisive
as public servant George Kennan’s Long Telegram or as sweeping as theologian
Reinhold Niebuhr’s book The Ironies of American History.1 Nevertheless I believe
Huntington’s article, written in 1954, rivaled them as a guide for the Cold War.
1950: The Navy in the National Strategy of Forward Defense
What were the strengths of Huntington’s description of a “transoceanic navy”
for the American nation? They were three. First, he did not speculate on a new
direction for the American navy. On the contrary, he described with a clarity all
might grasp the changes actually under way both in purpose and composition,
and why the changes of strategy and supporting forces should be stable, endur-
ing across changes of administration and military leadership.
Second, Huntington went beyond describing the new maritime strategy then
being embraced by the U.S. Navy. He described the national strategy of forward
engagement that was being fulfilled by the Marshall Plan for Europe, the restora-
tion of Japan, the fight against communist expansion in Greece, and the estab-
lishment of the NATO alliance. He pointed to the creation of the Sixth Fleet in
1948 as the most important arrow of seapower’s transoceanic influence, an ar-
row sunk deeply into the eastern Mediterranean. He emphasized what was in-
creasingly being taken for granted, namely, the exploitation of naval supremacy
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as the cornerstone of a policy of containment and forward defense. He expressed
a national maritime strategy.
Finally, Huntington was explicit that an armed force must be seen by the
American people as relevant and worth supporting financially. He hinted at,
though he did not explore, how the investment in military capability must be
weighed against present and future national and international economic
circumstances.
By the 1960s the roles of the Navy in the forward strategy had become multi-
faceted. The Soviet Union had achieved its own nuclear weapon capability, and
the bipolar U.S.-Soviet Cold War competition had reached a wary stalemate of
mutual nuclear deterrence. The Soviet Union had also established a significant
air and submarine threat at sea
sufficient to challenge an unin-
hibited “transoceanic” American
naval influence. The Soviet navy
would no longer tolerate unmiti-
gated American forward operations across secure oceanic sea lines of communi-
cations, and the U.S. Navy could no longer take maritime superiority for
granted. Expression of the expanded navy—and national—maritime strategy
had to be updated.
1970: A More Complicated Set of Navy Responsibilities
Starting in 1970, actions by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) reflected the
multiple roles in the design of the fleet. In 1974 Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner,
President of the Naval War College, expressed the changes in “Missions of the
U.S. Navy,” published in these pages.2 In his article Turner described a “redefini-
tion of traditional navy roles that had been in effect since 1970.” He wished “to
force the Navy to think [about itself in these new roles] in terms of output rather
than input.” Like Huntington, he said that a nation of free citizens and skeptical
taxpayers was “more interested in what is harvested than in what is sown.”3 Im-
plicitly he assumed that the United States was a maritime nation exercising a na-
tional maritime strategy tied to operations well away from its shores to confront
the Soviet Union—and that the Navy was the enabler of that worldwide con-
frontation and containment. In considerable detail he explained the logic of
four supporting missions for the U.S. Navy: strategic deterrence of nuclear war,
sea control to safeguard the sea lines of communication, projection of power as
the reward and output of the Navy, and naval presence forward to affirm Ameri-
can commitment to the defense of the free world. He said other states might
have other missions but that these were the four that served our national inter-
ests. With varying degrees of emphasis these four missions served the nation
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Will we have a unifying structure as clear and
long lasting as those enunciated by Samuel
Huntington and Stansfield Turner?
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well, became accepted, and ensured popular support for the Navy until the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union.
What led to that collapse and the next great transition? An important nuance
to the national strategy of patient containment is well described in a recent
book, The Reagan Imprint, by Professor John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate
School.4 In the 1980s President Ronald Reagan went beyond containment and
set out to push back against international communism, while establishing in
personal meetings with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that he wanted peace-
ful competition between the two superpowers and genuine nuclear arms reduc-
tion. The U.S. Navy’s contribution had never been greater, its presence around
the world more important, or its support of overseas activities more crucial than
they became during its effort to serve those ends. The Navy was indispensable in
fostering the sequence of economic and political consequences inside the Soviet
Union that, after a decade or more of unsustainable defense expenditures, re-
sulted in collapse.
1990: After the Fall—A Return to Projection of Power
By 1991 the consequences as they affected the Navy were nearly identical to what
Huntington described as the result of the fall of Germany and Japan. The Navy
returned to transoceanic operations to demonstrate its continuing viability and
marshal popular support. The role emphasizing projection of naval power was
described in a series of CNO white papers, beginning with The Way Ahead and
the more aptly titled . . . From the Sea.5 These expressed the projection mission
explicitly and, directly or indirectly, forward presence for peacekeeping. With a
de facto sea sanctuary temporarily assured, the missions were implemented with
large ships for efficient delivery of naval combat potential overseas. The Navy
bought new, more powerful, and more expensive weapons afloat, and the Ma-
rine Corps bought the capability to avoid direct, opposed assault with “ship-to-
objective maneuver,” as a safer but more expensive way to conduct what had
been its bread-and-butter mission ever since World War II, operational maneu-
ver from the sea.
But forward presence and crisis response became ever more difficult in the
1990s as the nation claimed its “peace dividend” and dramatically reduced the
proportion of the federal budget devoted to defense. Navy fleet numbers took a
nosedive, from almost six hundred ships to five hundred and then to less than
four hundred. Just “being there” was getting harder, and “there” had to be more
and more selective as pressure mounted throughout the 1990s to be in the Adri-
atic, the Arabian Gulf, and the western Pacific for extended periods.
It is deeply ironic that while the size of the fleet diminished by approximately
40 percent the demand on the Navy for crisis response actually rose. What was
H U G H E S 3 1
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Monday, May 14, 2007 3:57:11 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
This content downloaded from 
            205.155.65.226 on Tue, 10 Dec 2019 19:26:21 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
worse, the duration of the average response increased greatly. This was true
worldwide, but I will cite numbers in the U.S. European Command area of re-
sponsibility, because I have studied them the most closely. Before the fall of the
Soviet Union, from 1970 to 1989, the number of crises in the European theater
requiring response was 2.1 per year, with a median duration of less than a
month. From 1990 to 1996 there were 2.6 crises per year, with an average dura-
tion of 375 days. At the time of my study (1998) no one knew for sure whether
this rash of trouble spots would continue, but it was obvious that neither the
peaceable “end of history” of Francis Fukuyama’s famous prediction nor the
world harmony anticipated in 1991 was nigh. More and more Sixth Fleet ships
and aircraft were being siphoned off to the Middle East. Nor was there any evi-
dence that the demand for American military presence in Gulf waters was going
to be eliminated after our swift victory in DESERT STORM. The Navy was using
ships that were inefficiently large for the blockade and interdiction roles they
were playing. We needed more but smaller ships and aircraft for what have come
to be called constabulary roles—a multiplicity of activities that are neither quite
projection of power, peacekeeping presence, nor sea control.6
Meanwhile our forces in the Pacific were similarly strained with demands in
many places, but most notably with respect to the growing influence of China in
East Asia.
What was worse, the coastal sea sanctuary we had enjoyed was in jeopardy.
The inshore environment is replete with islands, shoals, bays, and inlets. It is
cluttered with coastal shipping, fishing boats, commercial aircraft, and oil rigs.
Littoral waters have become dangerous, from mines, coastal submarines, and
sudden land-, sea-, or air-launched missile strikes.7 Crippling attacks on USS
Stark (1987), USS Samuel B. Roberts (1988), USS Tripoli (1990), and most re-
cently USS Cole (2000) illustrated the variety of potential means, surprise being
the one common denominator of every successful attack.
2001: A New Transition
Evidence of the transition under way lies in the almost unassimilable whirlwind
of guidance, visions, operational concepts, appraisals, program guidance, and
decisions flowing from an unparalleled number of statements of strategy—for
starters, a National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, a National
Military Strategy, a National Strategy for Maritime Security, a National Fleet
Policy, and directives associated with the Quadrennial Defense Review. In addi-
tion, we published “Naval Power 21,” “Sea Power 21,” the “Naval Operational
Concept,” and the “Navy Strategic Planning Guidance.”8 The other armed ser-
vices issued analogous documents.
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Where is the staying power of these documents? What convergence, consis-
tency, and cohesiveness? Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, is working on a new maritime strategy for the Navy that he hopes can serve
as a steady hand on the tiller to last well beyond his personal tenure as CNO and
even that of the next presidential administration. If it is to be durable it must be
consistent with what de facto has been the long-standing national maritime
strategy of forward engagement, empowered by the U.S. Navy, to allow the na-
tion to sustain its political and military influence overseas.
Will we have a unifying structure as clear and long lasting as those enunciated
by Samuel Huntington and Stansfield Turner? Let us look beyond Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, not to conjecture future changes in force composition but instead
simply to state what is actually occurring and how, almost implicitly, the defense
establishment is responding for the long pull into the twenty-first century.
We cannot put equal weight on all circumstances and crises and be, as the slo-
gan goes, always ready for anything, anytime, anywhere. We should describe an
affordable American armed force that is no more costly in percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP) than now. The present defense budget already costs as
much as those of the next five or seven defense establishments, including
China’s.9 As Huntington and Turner insisted, the American people will want to
know not only what we, the defense establishment, expect to do to serve their in-
terests but also that it will cost them no more than at present.
Let us define a two-pronged national military strategy with two, and only
two, objectives: first, the capabilities to deal with a peer competitor, and sec-
ond, the means to conduct several small operations concurrently. Next we will
construct in sweeping terms the capabilities of the force components to meet
those two objectives. We must satisfy ourselves that the capabilities of all the
services will probably cost no more and might cost less than our present capa-
bilities. The final step is one I do not take here but merely discuss—to assess
whether this “bimodal force” is capable of dealing with other situations, if with
less efficiency.
The Bimodal Defense Establishment
Even the CNO cannot suggest a national maritime strategy.10 But I can do so, as-
serting that such a strategy reflects what is happening, is economically viable,
will be popular with the American people, and probes more deeply than a transi-
tory response to present circumstances in Iraq and tensions with China over Tai-
wan. The strategy will reflect not only what is transpiring as it may be inferred
from external events but also changes in operations and training that in due
course will affect force composition.
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The first mode aims at future peer competitors. But for the indefinite future
there is only one peer of concern, so let us be explicit: the high end of U.S. de-
fense planning should take aim at the People’s Republic of China.
Engaging the Emerging Peer Competitor
Evidently we do not wish to fight China, any more than we wanted to fight the
Soviet Union in the Cold War. We want to influence China. The exact nature of
that influence—whether it be collaboration, containment, or confrontation—is
very important, but it will probably change from decade to decade. The question
is: How can we best design American military capability as one component of a
bimodal force that will be robust across a spectrum of changing relationships
with China?
For example, here are two factors to be weighed:
• Foci of current relations with China are the Republic of China on Taiwan
and the unhealthy situation in North Korea. A durable American military
capability ought to reflect the consequences on force design if an accom-
modation is reached between “the two Chinas” or if a reunification occurs
between North and South Korea. I will outline an American force structure
that accommodates either the status quo or peaceful, voluntary transfor-
mations. Korea north and south is a situation best viewed not as a potential
regional conflict but almost entirely as it relates to China.
• China is in the process of creating an increasingly robust sea-denial
capability that reaches farther and farther off its coast. We must anticipate
that in due course China will attempt to shift its navy from sea denial to a
sea-control capability. This is because it is now beholden to the U.S. Navy
to protect its trade and imports of energy by sea. We ought to anticipate
that China may decide that this vulnerability is unacceptable for a peer of
the United States, or that the U.S. fleet is merely a paper tiger that can no
longer protect the trade of China or of anyone else.
The consequences of these two factors are major but need not affect the force
design criteria. Here is an outline of the high-end force mode, designed against
the only visible future peer:
• We must maintain strong and influential military capabilities in the western
Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters, such that China and its neighbor states
know we do not want Chinese soft or hard power to inhibit the freedom
and independence of those neighbors.
• The first element of U.S. forces is a robust offensive and defensive nuclear
deterrent. China has a nuclear weapon capability. It will grow, as much
because of the probable proliferation of these weapons among other Asian
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states as because it would serve as an instrument of U.S.-Chinese diplomacy
or military confrontation. The offensive and defensive capability also serves
importantly against Russia’s nuclear arsenal, an old role in strategic
deterrence.
• Under no foreseeable circumstances would we invade China. Therefore, as
the second element, we must influence China with American sea and air
power, accompanied by close relationships with friendly states that do not
wish to see Chinese hegemony in Asia. Maintaining the viability of our air
and naval forces into the indefinite future will require adjustment of future
designs in ways not clearly discernable. The designs, however, must
anticipate Chinese aspirations for a sea-control navy.
• As the third element, the American surveillance and reconnaissance advantage
must be maintained. Future designs will probably be a continuation and
evolution of the expensive satellite and other high-tech means at which we
are expert, accompanied by clandestine penetrations with Asia-centered
human and signals intelligence.
• Fourth, we will also need a command and control (C2) advantage using
networking technology. We in the Department of Defense (DoD) have been
self-critical of our own efforts, yet a reasonable appraisal of our information
technology is that the services and American industry have invested great
amounts of money and have achieved an advantage over the competition
that will serve well if edge-of-war tension arises between China and the
United States. But China as a potential peer competitor has the industrial
and intellectual skills to catch up, a situation to be avoided through
constant vigilance.
• Fifth and last is the logistics component that maintains the fighting elements
in the western Pacific. This is an expensive component that takes a
substantial fraction of the defense budget. For example, without its air
wing an aircraft carrier is only a highly efficient and mobile airfield. As a
“logistics” component, the carrier costs roughly the same amount of
money as its aircraft. Long-haul logistical support is the responsibility of
the Navy and the Air Force; thus, with respect to China these services will
be sustaining their own operations. Keying on China makes it easy to see
where to base forward support—in Hawaii, South Korea, Guam, Japan,
Okinawa, and Singapore, for example—and the desirability of warm
friendship with the Philippines.
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The Other End of the Spectrum: Small Wars and Peacemaking
By “small wars” I refer to the global war on terror and to constabulary and hu-
manitarian operations. “Stability operations,” “irregular warfare,” and “counter-
insurgency” are frequently used terms. A good shorthand word is peacemaking.
The upper limit of “small wars” is arbitrary, but the American forces that have
fought them have constituted no small fraction of military capability, if we call
to mind the Indian wars on the western frontier (1865–90), Army operations
during the Philippine Insurrection (1899–1902), and Marine Corps peacekeeping
operations in Central America in the 1920s and 1930s.11 A superb book covering
the long history of U.S. Army and Marine performance at the small-wars end of
the spectrum is Max Boot’s The Savage Wars of Peace.12
In small wars, a severe complication is that armed forces are often not in con-
trol. Though the DoD must design in advance a capability for a wide range of
peacemaking operations, the forces will neither constitute the entire capability
nor be governed exclusively by a military command. In contingency and
humanitarian operations, DoD
influence will be shared with the
State Department, the Central In-
telligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, sometimes the
departments of Justice and Home-
land Security, and even nongovernment organizations. No one below the
National Security Council can establish, in the several instances going on all over
the world, how U.S. operations are intended to proceed and goals to be accom-
plished. Further, these will be coalition operations, with host states and other
participating nations.
There is another important distinction. The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine
says American armed forces should not be committed without sure knowledge
of how the operation will conclude. It also mandates the use of sufficient—
implying preponderant—force. Neither criterion can apply to small wars or
constabulary operations, which tend to be open-ended. The war against stateless
terrorists is much more like the never-finished “wars” on crime and drugs than
what Weinberger envisioned—a war between states that ends in capitulation or
a negotiated peace after American aims are achieved.13
A complementary doctrine for “small” operations is badly needed. The lack
of one does not mean there has been no effort to distinguish between the two
ends of the spectrum of conflict. Three diverse examples will suffice, taken from
thinking now under way at the Naval Postgraduate School. Jan Breemer offers dif-
ferent principles for insurgencies in his prizewinning essay “Statistics, Real Estate,
and the Principles of War.”14 Raymond E. Franck and Terry C. Pierce describe the
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United States as a near-perfect enemy for terrorists and suggest things we could
do to be a tougher opponent, in “Disruptive Military Innovation and the War on
Terror: Some Thought for Perfect Opponents.”15 Commander (now Rear Admi-
ral) Bill McRaven, a Navy SEAL, recognizes that classical theory of war and its
principles need modification for special warfare. His master’s thesis on the sub-
ject was published as SpecOps in 1995.16
Despite these complications it is possible to describe the force elements for
small wars and operations. The elements will contrast sharply with—be virtu-
ally disjoint from—the forces for use against the peer competitor, at the other
end of the spectrum of warfare.
• Nuclear deterrence that applies against self-governing states—in fact, the
concept of deterrence itself—is irrelevant. A separate, expensive, warlike
campaign is now under way to forestall terrorist attacks of grave conse-
quences. The aspiration of this small-wars force element is to prevent even one
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon attack.
• The second element comprises the forces to engage in small wars and operations,
namely ground forces, with tactical support from the air. The primary role
of the Navy and Air Force here is to deliver the ground forces to the scene
of action rapidly and sustain them, often for months or even years.17
• The third element, intelligence and surveillance, is primarily based on human
intelligence. “HUMINT” takes time to establish, is difficult to maintain, and
is costly—so much so that it must be placed selectively, for a blanket capa-
bility around the world would be unthinkably expensive. High-tech intelli-
gence gathering is also part of the formula. High tech can be more quickly
deployed as we learn how to insert effective “hastily formed networks”
employed by signals intelligence experts, but effective small-wars intelli-
gence and surveillance are different in most respects from the intelligence/
surveillance/reconnaissance network against China.18
• The fourth element is a command-and-control system to link coalition forces
and agencies outside the American military establishment. Those who tilled
this weed-strewn soil in the heyday of NATO know that even for operations
between semipermanent, treaty-governed forces under international com-
mand, the problems of reliable, secure, swift communications are endless.
One way to appreciate the future difficulties in small-wars C2 is to imagine
the challenges as the U.S. Navy develops a highly desirable, multinational
“thousand-ship navy.”19
• Fifth is the logistics element that delivers, supports, and sustains the forces
operating on land. Sea and air components do the long-haul delivery. Army,
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Marine Corps, and special forces conduct mostly their own in-theater
support.20 Since in small wars there will be hot spots in many places around
the world, agility and adaptability become bywords for these operations,
much more so than for confronting China. Logistics is again a very large
and costly component. The advantage of smallness in scale is offset by the
vast panorama of possible contingencies, the many places they occur, and
their history of ugly longevity.
Observe again the striking contrast with the force composition for the peer
competitor. Operations carried out by a peacemaking force are quite dissimilar.
This is why a force designed for the middle—crudely, the composition that
served well for “two major contingencies” in the 1990s and until the watershed
attacks in 2001 against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon—is badly configured
to handle either the China or small-wars end of the spectrum of conflict.
Affordability
The aim in American competition with China should be to keep that competi-
tion economic and political. Each side has advantages and disadvantages. We
watch the Chinese economy warily, on one hand, because strong, sustained
growth will sharpen the competition and, on the other hand, because a collapse
or serious downturn might create internal political chaos there that would with-
out doubt affect the world’s economy as well as our own. At the same time there
are plenty of concerns for the American economy. The short-term causes are
much in the news, but the vital aspect is our long-term economic health. Health
implies not the absence of bubbles and downturns but resilience through ex-
ploiting the virtues—some would say the mean-spiritedness—of capitalist
competition. Defense’s contribution, one that assuredly will be demanded by
the American people, is to avoid excessive expenditure.
Economic considerations at the small-wars peacemaking ends of the spec-
trum must be based on confrontations that cannot be peaceful. Here we will not
infrequently resort to force of arms and must expect to fund a stream of “small”
operations. Inescapably the long war against terrorism will be episodic and
marked by many campaigns, some of them long lasting. What is the expected
economic impact on defense expenditures? I don’t know. Despite much inflam-
matory rhetoric, the cost of operations in Iraq has been modest compared with
wars like Korea, Vietnam, and upward. Evidence from American history is a
mixed bag. The American economy did not seem to suffer when substantial frac-
tions of the Army and Marine Corps were engaged in many constabulary opera-
tions overseas from 1898 until World War II. On the other hand, when the “Two
Ocean Navy” buildup commenced in the mid-1930s during the Great Depres-
sion, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration seemed eager to disengage,
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replacing peacekeeping in Latin America with a Good Neighbor Policy. But if we
are to focus effort on peacemaking around the world, it would be useful to know the
economic history, along with the military history, of small wars of the nineteenth-
century British Empire and of the early-twentieth-century United States.
The often unnoticed expense of the transoceanic strategy is logistical. I know
of no data, but at a guess half the U.S. defense budget is expended just to operate
our forces transoceanically. It is an unavoidable cost at both ends of the bimodal
spectrum. It is a burden borne by no other nation.
A suitable benchmark is a defense budget that does not grow as a fraction of
the gross domestic product. The federal government took its “peace dividend”
and reduced defense expenditures substantially in the 1990s. Expenditures bot-
tomed out at 3 percent of the GDP, their lowest point since the late 1940s. Since
the DoD budget is still by far the largest defense budget in the world, we should
aim to work within the current level, which is now between 3.5 and 4 percent of
GDP. The Congress and the nation should be cautious about increasing it, be-
cause economic strength is as important as military capability and international
political influence.
The war on terrorism extends well beyond Defense Department operations.
There are many players, not least the Department of Homeland Security. A strong
homeland defense alone can never be sufficient: first, because with the advantage
of initiative terrorists will sooner or later penetrate any defense; second, because a
disastrous attack would be economically crippling; and third, because as we have
already seen from expenditures for airline, port, and many other forms of domes-
tic security, homeland defense is extremely expensive and plays into the enemy’s
hands economically. Our successful strategy must continue to be a combined
“homeland defense and overseas offense.” The overseas operations, borne mostly
by DoD, are expensive because we must go and often stay somewhere—and that
“somewhere” is many places. Yet conducting overseas operations will be far less
costly in the long run than keeping our guard up only at home.
In terms of affordability, the watchword for influencing China is blend—the
right mix of economic, military, and political astuteness. The watchword for
small wars is caution—awareness that employing forces can become as expen-
sive as procuring them. Wars, big and small, are notorious as a way in which
great powers have destroyed their economies and brought themselves to ruin.
Wars in Between?
After conjecturing a suitable, affordable bimodal force, the final step is to test
how much risk is entailed should there be a theater war for which it is not config-
ured. There should be no concern that the shift is risky. For better or worse, the
forces the Navy, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force operate now
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will be the foundation of their capabilities for at least a decade. During the last
fifteen years the armed forces were configured to fight two major contingencies.
Except for the Coast Guard, all were designed for “wars in between.”
In the forty years when U.S. policy was to contain the Soviet Union, the armed
forces were designed against a single foe. With patience, military readiness, and
diplomatic wisdom we and our allies avoided war with the Soviet Union. When we
employed the same forces in many other fights (often to resist Soviet-sponsored
communist expansion around the world), they were ill designed and sometimes
badly trained for such operations, from major theater wars fought in Korea and
Vietnam down to such successful crisis responses as the first Lebanon (1958),
Grenada, and Haiti and unsuccessful ones like the Iranian rescue mission, the
second Lebanon (1983), and Somalia. A future combination of high- and low-
end bimodal forces to deal with major contingencies cannot be perfectly suited
either. The combination might be imperfect but sufficient. Or it might entail so
much risk that we would not wish to undertake the operation. I cannot imagine
who the high-risk “in between” enemy can be, so readers must specify their own
foes to conquer—or achieve a negotiated peace with, per the Weinberger Doc-
trine. They should pick their foes for the 2020–30 time frame, because it will be
that long before a new bimodal force replaces the present two-contingencies
force. The more the reader surveys the world and picks several different foes, the
better the test will be.
The Navy in the Bimodal Force
The American navy is transitioning from a fleet that responded to the 1990s pro-
gram guidance to handle two major contingencies, nominally centered on
North Korea and Southwest Asia. In that guidance maritime superiority was
taken for granted, there was no peer to influence, and small wars were ignored.
Today the Department of Defense, with the Navy following in its wake, has
transitioned away from two-contingencies force planning.
Half the transition concerns relations with China. I have mentioned the
steady shift of Navy forces from the Atlantic and Mediterranean to the western
Pacific. Although the American people still take sea control largely for granted,
the nations of Asia do not. They welcome the American navy because they de-
pend on it to protect their sea lanes. The Pacific Fleet concerns itself today
mostly with Taiwan and Korea, while supporting friends of the United States
and warily watching the extension of China’s sea-denial capabilities. Just beyond
the horizon is a predictable aspiration in China to achieve sea control in the
western Pacific and Indian oceans, with the prospect that the U.S. Navy must
think seriously again about command of the seas and the share of the fleet de-
signed specifically to retain maritime superiority in the twenty-first century.
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The other half of the transition is a force designed for the large number of
“small” operations, expeditionary in nature, in which the Navy will continue to
participate. Partly these operations are to respond to state crises, instabilities,
and insurrections; partly to resist stateless terrorists, pirates, drug runners, and
illegal immigrants; partly to guarantee energy supplies for the free world; and
partly to answer natural or man-made disasters with humanitarian operations,
in which the Navy has been leader and major contributor. The Navy no longer
regards these many activities as “lesser included cases” of theater war. It now says
they entail forces with unique capabilities and has started to develop fleet com-
ponents that can be distributed in more and smaller packages and to partner fre-
quently with our international friends.
Huntington and Turner both emphasized the need for popular acceptance
and tied it to affordability. The transition under way will appeal to the American
public but not be so popular that the U.S. Navy’s budget will grow. A rash of re-
cent studies expresses concern about the shrinking size of the fleet.21 These stud-
ies point out that at the same time the number of ships in the Navy has gone
down, its total combat capability has gone up in terms of missiles carried to sea,
aircraft sorties flown, accuracy of weapons delivered, and rate of targets at-
tacked. But they conclude that within the current shipbuilding budget—and by
implication the aircraft procurement budget—the current force of only about
three hundred ships must shrink further, barring a change in average unit cost or
a reconfiguration to smaller ships in a more distributed force. The essential
point is that all of these generally Navy-friendly and well-intended studies as-
sume that the shipbuilding budget cannot increase.
We don’t know in detail what the Navy force should look like. We know it will
come from the loom that wove the fabric of the projection-oriented Navy of the
1990s, which in turn was partly composed of the residuals of the four-mission
Navy of the 1970s and 1980s. The existing Navy comprises large, efficient ships
to project power to the land, principally in the form of air strikes, missiles, and
Marine elements. Against China, the need to threaten air and missile strikes will
not change, but China is developing the means to attack large ships at sea. It is
time to explore a more distributed fleet that is offensively disposed yet can suffer
losses and fight on, for no defense at sea can be perfect against a skilled oppo-
nent. Marine elements have a muted role, if any, in the naval configuration to in-
fluence China. The Marine Corps will continue to win the support of Congress
and the American people as staunch, adaptive fighters, but they will retain that
support by being proficient in small wars and peacemaking operations.
Nor do I mean to say large aircraft carriers and ships for amphibious assault
will soon be useless and should be scrapped. On the contrary, the carriers are ef-
ficient and of proven versatility in almost any small-war contingency. Carriers
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are so valuable in fact that one might wish to have aircraft flying from as many as
twenty-five or thirty “airfields” afloat. The nation cannot, however, afford the
cost of building and operating thirty large carriers, the CVNs. The practical ap-
proach is to sustain an affordable number of CVNs and supplement them with
smaller, more distributable airfields at sea that carry unmanned aerial vehicles,
helicopters, and (one may hope) STOVL* aircraft—the performance of which
may not match CTOL aircraft but are suitable for small wars.22 Nor should exist-
ing amphibious ships be discarded just because the need for opposed, forcible
entry is rare. Their aircraft, small craft, bunk space, and medical facilities give
them proven value in constabulary and humanitarian operations.
The submarine force is a major player in any attempt to influence China. One
can easily envision a “no-man’s-land” in the East and South China seas where
neither warships nor commercial traffic dare to venture on the surface, creating
the “empty ocean” once predicted by John Keegan, who foresaw a time when
nothing could survive on the sur-
face.23 American submarines de-
stroying commercial ships will
represent a paradoxical return to
times past but a logical expansion
of their present missions. As with
aircraft carriers, the issue will not
be having too many submarines but too few of them, because nuclear propul-
sion is expensive. If this new mission transpires, the construction of nonnuclear
submarines will make sense to complement the present all-nuclear-powered un-
dersea fleet.
Submarines will continue to play a central role in nuclear deterrence. But for
active defense when deterrence fails, missile-launching cruisers on the surface
will, when properly positioned in the right numbers, be able to shoot down
many or most of any enemy’s regional and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The U.S. Navy has great capacity to adapt its aircraft and missiles afloat. Our
missile cruisers and destroyers update their offense by updating their missiles.
Modernization of the defense is harder, a future problem not yet solved. The so-
lutions will probably be different for a confrontation with China than for small
wars. The Navy is experimenting with mission modularity while simultaneously
taking a cautious step toward a more distributed force with two new Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) designs and experimentation with other small, high-speed
ships. As the Navy shifts focus to “green-water” (inshore) and “brown-water”
(riverine) operations, a continuation is predictable of the trend toward more
and smaller air and surface combatants inshore.
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sequence of economic and political conse-
quences inside the Soviet Union that resulted
in collapse.
* STOVL: short takeoff, vertical landing; CTOL: conventional takeoff and landing.
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A very recent Navy role is defense against terrorist attacks in ports and in the
littorals. Still evolving, the role is shared with the Coast Guard, the Department
of Homeland Security, port-city governments, and other agencies domestically.
It is also being worked out with foreign governments internationally. There is no
more clear-cut evidence of a de facto bimodal approach by the Navy than the
sharp distinction between its contribution to nuclear deterrence against respon-
sible states and its commitment to help protect against nuclear, chemical, and
biological attacks by irresponsible stateless entities.
I have emphasized scouting and networking as critical components. Navy
surveillance, reconnaissance, and C2 networks are not hard to put in perspec-
tive, for legacy systems—most of them unheralded, invisible, even intangible—
become obsolete much faster than ships and aircraft in the fast-moving world of
information technology. Weighing the cost-effectiveness of updates is a contin-
uing process, quietly going on, because the investment cost is substantial.
Against China, Navy high-tech systems are robust and more or less the right
ones; “Steady as you go” is a reasonable rudder order. At the small-wars end of
the spectrum, there is (in gross terms) simply a vacuum to be filled. A benefit of
concentrating on the need will be to accelerate stronger human intelligence, net-
work security and intrusion against diffuse foes, operational connections with
friendly states, and a structure to work with other American agencies.
Navy personnel are a different, special aspect. The important descriptor of
the people factor is turnover. The downside of personnel turnover is constant,
inescapable turbulence, because of the perpetual need for recruiting, training,
and assignment, which has a much greater effect on military organizations than
on businesses. Associated is the seemingly never-solved problem of balance in
career-long experiential and educational maturation to achieve sufficient num-
bers of qualified people working in new technologies, foreign relations, strategy,
and the economics of defense. But my purpose here is to point out the rarely no-
ticed upside: that personnel turnover is the way to step out of the past and accel-
erate a transition. This opportunity to transform people is especially important
for the Navy, whose major pieces of large, expensive equipment sometimes must
last forty or fifty years. The Army and Marine Corps, it seems, are transitioning
faster, because lives now depend on grasping the demands for the tactics and
training of peacemaking. The Navy, because of its sea sanctuary, has not been
shot at much and has had less motivation to change. That is why a rich under-
standing of the bimodal force’s implications is the path out of the hardware
straitjacket.
Do you doubt that a transition can occur without new sensors and weapons
because new tactics and operations are impossible without new hardware? A lit-
tle reflection should convince anyone otherwise. Between the attack on Pearl
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Harbor in December 1941 and the start of the great sweep westward to Japan
that began at Tarawa in November 1943, every class of U.S. Navy warship
changed its role, from battleships to aircraft carriers, to heavy and light cruisers,
to destroyers, and even to submarines. They were the same warships, but with a
great sense of urgency the crews were taught new combat roles, and the new
roles were supplemented with almost invisible new capabilities to complete the
fighting fleet that would soon carry the war to the Japanese home islands.24
Personnel turnover is the opportunity to change, and the training and educa-
tion to effect the change are explicitly the CNO’s responsibility. From my per-
spective on the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, he will know the
transition is complete when we in the Navy schools are teaching to the demands
of the bimodal force, from language skills to inshore combat.
Transitions and Transformations
The swift changes in the fleet during World War II can be called trans-
formational. They were sudden and radical, only dimly foreseen, and urgent, be-
cause national survival was in question. Military organizations—successful
ones, at least—respond quickly when the national jugular is threatened. In nor-
mal times, the steady state offers a great power the opportunity for incremental
refinements of its fighting machine’s tactics and equipment that everyone un-
derstands and is comfortable with. I have used the term “transitional” to de-
scribe changes that are neither transformational nor incremental. A transition is
impelled by external events and is observably occurring. It need not be wrought
in an atmosphere of crisis and desperation, but if the new circumstances are not
recognized or if the flywheel of continuity resists the need for orderly transition,
the eventual result will be a radical, abrupt, financially irresponsible transfor-
mation. The Army and Marine Corps have been criticized pitilessly for their less
than perfect peacemaking in Afghanistan and Iraq. I think they deserve more
sympathy than they have received as long as they are in transition, evolving and
adapting into what I’ve called bimodal forces.25 The American armed forces have
never before fought to the standard of perfection of today’s critics. “The
Greatest Generation” that won World War II would by today’s standards be
judged incompetent. The Navy has been transitioning perhaps too slowly, but it
also deserves some slack. First, the need for a bimodal navy is less evident, be-
cause the fleet has scarcely been attacked or suffered loss at sea. Second, the cur-
rent Chief of Naval Operations has already established the foundation for a new,
durable maritime strategy.26
If Admiral Mullen and the Navy’s leadership succeed, the strategy will lead to
the right education and training, soon followed by an affordable system of ships,
aircraft, sensors, command-and-control systems, and logistical support for a
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bimodal force structure to sustain the Navy’s part of a durable national mari-
time strategy for well into the twenty-first century.
N O T E S
This article was prepared for a Center for Na-
val Analyses–sponsored conference, “The Fu-
ture of Maritime Strategy,” held on 26
October 2006.
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Ironies of American
History (New York: Scribner’s, 1952). Niebuhr
wrote on the values of Western civilization,
the need to preserve them, the innocent at-
tempts to improve on them, and the malevo-
lent attempts to replace them with fascism
and communism. He said it was absurd to say
the sins of the West were in any way compa-
rable to the crimes of Soviet despotism. He
counseled resistance by patience, temperate
resolution, and economic warfare but never
by the use of nuclear weapons. George F.
Kennan sent what became famous as the
“Long Telegram” from the American em-
bassy in Moscow in 22 February 1946. The
widely read version was that published in
Foreign Affairs in 1947 as “The Sources of So-
viet Conduct.”
2. Stansfield Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy,”
Naval War College Review 26, no. 5 (March–
April 1974), pp. 2–17, reprinted in vol. 51,
no. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 87–103.
3. “The people” is the great American tyrant,
the more so because constitutional interpre-
tations grant both the majority and several
minorities enormous and inconsistent influ-
ence. It is, however, probably a correct gener-
ality that our taxpayers expect their armed
forces to stay ahead in the latest technology
but suspect that building new technology into
every piece of equipment (tanks, ships, air-
craft, etc.) is unaffordable.
4. John Arquilla, The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in
American Foreign Policy from the Collapse of
Communism to the War on Terror (Chicago,
I. R. Dee, 2006).
5. These documents are reprinted in John B.
Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the
1990s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 27
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press,
2006), available at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/
npapers/np27/NP27web.pdf.
6. One way to update Turner’s missions for the
Cold War, and one in which constabulary
roles fit more comfortably, appeals to the
four functions of a navy described in Wayne
P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics and Coastal Com-
bat (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1999), p. 9: at sea, a navy (1) ensures that our
own goods and services are safe and (2) that
the enemy’s are not; from the sea, it (3) guar-
antees safe delivery of goods and services
ashore and (4) prevents delivery ashore by an
enemy.
7. Worldwide, by far the largest share of damage
to merchantmen, tankers, and warships since
1967 has been inflicted by missile attacks.
8. For the “Naval Operational Concept” and the
“Navy Strategic Planning Guidance” see
Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the
1990s.
9. One wonders whether the closed society of
the People’s Republic of China is as clever in
concealing its actual defense expenditures as
was the Soviet Union. Even if that were true,
U.S. defense expenditures would still dwarf
all others.
10. The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible
for organizing, training, and equipping the
Navy. He does not make strategy, not even
naval strategy, but he cannot fulfill his re-
sponsibility without knowing how the navy
he leads will be employed by the combatant
commanders who will fight it. Therefore
CNOs have expressed their design intentions
as “maritime strategies” and the like. These
statements have been welcome and clarifying.
11. Some say Army stability operations in the
Philippines lasted much longer.
12. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small
Wars and the Rise of American Power (New
York: Basic Books, 2002). Boot disregards hu-
manitarian operations, however.
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13. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger de-
veloped the doctrine for the 1980s with the
assistance of his military aide, Colin Powell. It
much influenced Powell’s actions as secretary
of state and is frequently called the “Powell
Doctrine” now. The doctrine says that all the
following six tests are to be met before com-
mitting forces to fighting overseas: vital U.S.
or allied interests must be at stake; “combat
troops” should be “committed wholeheart-
edly . . . to win”; political and military objec-
tives should be clearly defined; objectives and
forces “must be continually reassessed and
adjusted if necessary”; there must be reason-
able assurance of support by Congress and
the American people; and commitment of
forces to combat should be the last resort.
There are subtleties in all the tests. For exam-
ple, they recognize that a great power never
dabbles by going in, getting bloodied, and
backing out; it stays until the “clearly defined
objectives” are met. Combat troops are seem-
ingly specifically at issue here, so that the
doctrine does not extend to bombing or mis-
sile attacks from afar.
14. Published in Military Review (September–
October 2006).
15. Appearing in the June 2006 Defense and Secu-
rity Analysis.
16. SpecOps: Case Studies in Special Warfare Theory
and Practice (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1995).
17. Reflection on the history of peacekeeping and
peacemaking operations will convince the
reader that these four short lines are too cryp-
tic. Seeing that is the beginning of small-wars
wisdom, for “small” operations are in fact ex-
traordinarily intricate and hard to describe,
and require small-wars professionals. Con-
sider merely the past and present inshore and
riverine roles of the Navy. Nevertheless, I
cling to the belief that small wars are first and
foremost operations by the Army, Marine
Corps, and special forces on the ground.
18. “Hastily formed networks” is a term used by
a consortium of Naval Postgraduate School
faculty with practical experience in rapid de-
ployment to several Asian states and in hu-
manitarian support of the 2004–2005 tsunami
and Hurricane Katrina relief operations.
19. “Thousand-ship navy” is a term introduced
by the CNO to foster coalition operations at
sea. The purpose of the slogan is not to create
a bigger navy on the cheap but to ensure that
the U.S. Navy is not thought of as the police-
man of all the world’s coastal waters.
20. It does no harm to point out again the fre-
quent intricacy of small-wars logistics.
“Mostly” admits of in-theater air and river
traffic, too.
21. Five of these are Stuart E. Johnson and Arthur
K. Cebrowski, Alternative Fleet Architecture
Design (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
Univ., 2005); Congressional Budget Office,
Options for the Navy’s Future Fleet (Washing-
ton, D.C.: 2006); Robert O. Work, The Chal-
lenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger
Better? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strate-
gic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002); and
Ronald O’Rourke, Potential Navy Force Struc-
ture and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress (updated 30 March 2005)
and Navy Ship Acquisition: Options for Lower-
Cost Ship Designs—Issues for Congress (up-
dated 10 November 2005) (both Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Research Service).
22. STOVL aircraft can fly from an aircraft car-
rier much smaller than a CVN. CTOL aircraft
fly from large carriers. Before World War II
the Army Air Corps demonstrated that car-
rier aircraft could not match land-based air-
craft performance (in operational ceiling,
range, payload, etc.). But the flexibility of a
moving airfield was recognized and valued,
carriers prospered and multiplied, and by
midwar our carrier aircraft performance
matched or exceeded that of Japanese army
and navy aircraft.
23. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The
Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York: Vi-
king, 1988). Keegan’s conclusion (pp. 266–
75) is entitled “An Empty Ocean.” However
he does not do justice to the fact that blue
water “no-man’s-lands” have existed since
aircraft became ship killers and that, sooner
rather than later, control of the oceans’ sur-
face must be established so commerce can
move on it.
24. These tactically influential equipment changes
included radar, the Combat Information Cen-
ter, a proliferation of short-range antiaircraft
guns, second- and third-generation aircraft,
and torpedoes that worked. Old battleships
were used for shore bombardment, because
they were designed before World War I and
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lacked speed to stay up with the fleet. The
new fast battleships, the first six of which
were commissioned in 1941–42, went with
the fleet but relinquished their capital-ship
role to aircraft carriers. Most of our mine
force, amphibious ships, landing craft, and
PT boats were built from scratch to fill a void.
25. “Bimodal force” is, by the way, an inelegant if
eye-catching term. I will be happy if “bimodal”
does not long survive this article, although I
believe in the need for the kind of force struc-
ture it connotes.
26. Among other things, Admiral Mullen’s task-
ing for 2006 directs: “Develop adaptive force
packages and flexible deployment concepts to
include NSW, U.S. Coast Guard, and coali-
tion partners in support of operations in
blue, green, and brown water environments
that are aligned with the National Fleet Policy
and the National Strategy for Maritime
Security.”
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